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Abstract
Niccolò Cabeo, a Jesuit based in Northern Italy, wrote a massive commentary on
Aristotle’s Meteorology that was first printed in 1646. The central concepts of this
work emerged from the chymical philosophy of his time. Cabeo advocated a cor-
puscular matter theory that integrated Paracelsian principles and Aristotelian
elements. Furthermore, he rejected the application of metaphysics and mathe-
matics to natural philosophy. Instead he promoted experiential and experimental
practices, including chymical ones, to investigate what he called the “real physi-
cal” world. Cabeo’s epistemology sustained his adaptation of Aristotle, whereby
substantial forms have no explanatory role, but matter and form are two differ-
ent kinds of substances that differ with respect to the size of their constituent
corpuscles and their forces. Maintaining the need to use Aristotle as a founda-
tion, Cabeo relied on his unique interpretations of the text of the Meteorology in
order to demonstrate that his matter theory was not alien to Aristotelianism.
Ever since Charles Schmitt showed that there were multiple
Renaissance Aristotelianisms, the vibrant and self-critical nature
of Peripatetics has been recognized.1 Recent scholarship has amply
demonstrated that the seventeenth-century rejection and replace-
ment of Aristotelian natural philosophy was not a sudden gestalt
switch. Rather, a number of savants, such as Descartes, Gassendi,
and Hobbes, who claimed to overturn traditional ways of explain-
ing nature, nevertheless relied on the concepts and vocabulary
* I thank Katharine Park, Christoph Lüthy, and an anonymous reader for
their advice and comments. Research and writing of this article was funded by a
Rockefeller Fellowship at the History of Science Department, University of Okla-
homa, Villa I Tatti, and the FWO at K.U. Leuven.
1 For self-criticism among Aristotelians, see: Ian Maclean, “Foucault’s Renais-
sance Episteme Reassessed: An Aristotelian Counterblast,” Journal of the History of
Ideas 59 (1998), 149-166. For the vitality of the Peripatetic line of thought, see:
Christia Mercer, “The Vitality and Importance of Early Modern Aristotelianism,”
The Rise of Modern Philosophy, ed. Tom Sorrell (Oxford, 1993), 33-67.
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of the schoolmen.2 Similarly, movements within the Aristotelian
framework gave rise to developments in the works of the novatores.
Examples include Giacomo Zabarella’s logic, which, it is argued,
influenced, among others, Francis Bacon and his emphasis on
induction, and Sennert’s corpuscular hylomorphism, which con-
tributed to the eventual rise of atomism.3
In a number of works William R. Newman and Lawrence M.
Principe have shown that seventeenth-century corpuscular natu-
ral philosophies grew out of the medieval alchemical tradition,
by following Geber’s Summa perfectionis, which emphasized the
creation of new substances through partes minimae and utilized
experimental tests as evidence for the existence of these cor-
puscles. The Geberian line of thought is found in the writings of
Daniel Sennert, the Wittenberg physician and professor. Sennert
contended that his tests demonstrated the corpuscular nature of
matter. Moreover, he believed that corpuscularian thought was
not at odds with Aristotelian precepts. In his later writings, adopting
Avicenna’s position on the nature of mixture, he argued that the
corpuscular constituents of mixtures remain intact, that is, do
not lose or have diminished their substantial forms. Similarly
George Starkey, the American physician and chymist, combined
scholastic hylomorphism and Geberian corpuscular matter theory
in his chymical practice. The works of both Starkey and Sennert
2 Dennis Des Chene, Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Car-
tesian Thought (Ithaca, 1996); Roger Ariew, Descartes and the Last Scholastics (Ithaca,
1999); Cees Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism: The Late Aristotelian
Setting of Thomas Hobbes’s Natural Philosophy (Leiden, 2002); Margaret Osler, “Ren-
aissance Humanism, Lingering Aristotelianism and the New Natural Philosophy:
Gassendi on Final Causes,” in Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Jill Kraye
and M. W. F. Stone (London, 2000), 193-208.
3 For Sennert see: Michael Stolberg, “Particles of the Soul: The Medical and
Lutheran Context of Daniel Sennert’s Atomism,” Medicina nei secoli n.s. 15 (2003),
177-203; Emily Michael, “Sennert’s Sea Change: Atoms and Causes,” in Late Medi-
eval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories, ed. Christoph Lüthy, John E.
Murdoch, and William R. Newman (Leiden, 2001), 331-362; William R. Newman,
“Corpuscular Alchemy and the Tradition of Aristotle’s Meteorology, with special
reference to Daniel Sennert,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15
(2001), 145-153; Kurd Lasswitz, Geschichte der Atomistik, (Hamburg/Leipzig, 1890)
I: 436-454. For Bacon and Zabarella see: A. C. Crombie, Robert Grosseteste and the
Origins of Experimental Science 1100-1700 (Oxford, 1953), 300-303; Antonio Perez-
Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition (Oxford,
1988), 225-238; Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cam-
bridge, 1974), 54-58.
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influenced Robert Boyle, and thus are key to understanding the
development of seventeenth-century matter theory.4
The studies of Newman and Principe have brought to light the
intertwining of Aristotelian and chymical matter theories and
their presence in elite circles of natural philosophy during the
seventeenth century.5 There remain, however, doubts over the
degree to which Geber influenced early modern chymistry.6 Equally,
the scope of experientially based chymical matter theory during
the first half of the seventeenth century is not fully known. The
contents of Niccolò Cabeo’s Commentaria in libros Meteorologicorum
(1646, reprinted 1686), however, demonstrate that chymical matter
theory and Geberian experimental procedures spread into the
Aristotelian commentary tradition and was developed not just in
ultramontane Europe, England, and its colonies, but also in Italy.7
Cabeo’s corpuscular theory, which he contended was supported
by chymical practice and experiments, stands out because of his
rejection of metaphysical speculation in general and of substan-
tial forms specifically, in addition to his attempt to reconcile
Aristotle and Paracelsus.
The middle years of the seventeenth century witnessed much
diversity and complexity in Aristotelian natural philosophy, where
qualifiers such as ‘strict’, ‘conservative’, ‘secular’, and ‘Jesuit’
cannot always be applied with any definite meaning. Cabeo’s
commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorology is perhaps one of the most
4 William R. Newman, “Experimental Corpuscular Theory in Aristotelian Al-
chemy: From Geber to Sennert,” in Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular
Matter Theories, 291-329; William R. Newman and Lawrence M. Principe, Alchemy
Tried in the Fire: Starkey, Boyle, and the Fate of Helmontian Chymistry (Chicago, 2002),
18-34; William R. Newman, Gehennical Fires: The Lives of George Starkey, an American
Alchemist in the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), esp. 20-53, 92-114;
id., “The Alchemical Sources of Robert Boyle’s Corpuscular Philosophy,” Annals
of Science 53 (1996), 567-585; id., “Boyle’s Debt to Corpuscular Alchemy,” in Robert
Boyle Reconsidered, ed. Michael Hunter (Cambridge, 1994), 177-192.
5 On the use of the word “chymistry” see: William R. Newman and Lawrence
M. Principe, “Alchemy vs. Chemistry: The Etymological Origins of a Historio-
graphic Mistake,” Early Science and Medicine 3 (1998), 32-65; Niccolò Cabeo, the
subject of this paper, used the terms “chimicus” and “chymicus” interchangeably.
6 For a discussion of these doubts, see: Newman and Principe, Alchemy Tried
in the Fire, 249.
7 Most studies on seventeenth-century corpuscular chymistry focus almost
entirely on northern Europe. E.g., Clericuzio, Elements, Principles and Corpuscles: A
Study of Atomism and Chemistry in the Seventeenth Century (Dordrecht, 2000); New-
man and Principe, Alchemy Tried in the Fire.
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difficult pieces of Aristotelian commentary literature to classify.
It is innovating, yet takes pain to maintain traditional forms of
argumentation, retaining Aristotle as a starting point for investi-
gations into nature. Nevertheless, many of Cabeo’s ideas reso-
nate with the positions of the novatores: he was in favor of
Paracelsian matter theory and was a proponent of the use of
chymical testing; just like Descartes, he argued for the elimina-
tion of substantial forms as a conceptual tool in natural philoso-
phy; in line with the Neostoics, he thought form was an active
spirit, yet entirely material; similarly to Francis Bacon, he chas-
tised those who were overly concerned with words rather than
physical objects and urged researchers to penetrate into the depths
of nature. In other respects, however, Cabeo cannot be seen as
a participant of some of the seventeenth-century movements that
defined the development of modern science: he neither pro-
moted a mechanical conception of the universe, nor tolerated
the intrusion of mathematics into physics; and although he con-
ceded that reliance on philosophical or exegetical commentary
was insufficient, he insisted on writing a literal commentary on
Aristotle. Yet again, the Aristotle that Cabeo emphasized was
atypical for most Aristotelians of his time.
Cabeo (1585-1650) was a Jesuit who studied and taught at
Parma, Mantua, Bologna, and Ferrara among other locales in
northern Italy, working both in colleges as well as courts.8 He
was successful in both arenas and went from being known as a
child prodigy to eventually gaining a reputation as a “grand’ huomo,
famous in print.” Cabeo’s learning gained him entry into Fer-
dinando Gonzaga’s ducal court where he was on familiar terms
with the Duke himself.9 His fame from print derived from his
only two published works: the Philosophia magnetica, published in
1629, which is best known for its anti-Copernican stance, its
explanation of magnetic and electrical phenomena as caused by
effluvia, and its attacks on Gilbert’s contentions of the magne-
8 For his location in particular years see Ugo Baldini, “L’altro polo dell’attività
scientifica: La provincia veneta,” in Legem impone subactis (Rome, 1992), 427-434;
id., “I Gesuiti nelle corti padane (1600-1650),” in Saggi sulla cultura della Com-
pagnia di Gesù (secoli XVI-XVIII) (Padua, 2000), 171-211. For Cabeo’s biography
see: A. Ingegno, “Niccolò Cabeo,” in Dizionario biografico degli italiani (Rome,
1972), XV, 686-688.
9 Giuseppe Gorzoni, Istoria del collegio di Mantova della compagnia di Gesù, ed.
Antonella Bilotto and Flavio Rurale (Mantova, 1997), 146.
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tism of the earth.10 His second printed piece, the Commentaria,
expanded the number of topics treated and discussed a wide
variety subjects as well as Aristotle’s text in its lengthy four vol-
umes.
The scarce existing literature on Cabeo’s work takes two main
approaches. According to the first, he is a philosopher who “used
traditional Aristotelian arguments.”11 The second takes its vision
from J. L. Heilbron’s assessment of Cabeo’s two books as “impor-
tant” works of the scientific revolution.12 Thus, Cabeo’s relation
to Galileo has been explored, and his writings are considered
important for his alleged contribution to discovery of the isoch-
ronism of pendula, their discussion of the laws of motion, and
the description of the experiments that Cabeo and Giovanni
Battista Baliani carried out in Parma, whereby they concluded
that the velocity of falling objects is independent of weight and
increases with time.13 Both views of Cabeo fail to convey any
sense of what the Commentaria’s larger purpose was. Cabeo cre-
ated an Aristotelian natural philosophy that was to be concerned
strictly with material bodies composed of corpuscles; its episte-
mological foundation was to be experiential and experimental.
Cabeo separated physica, as he called it, from the other two
subjects he considered part of speculative science: metaphysics
and mathematics.14 For him physica concerns the sensible prop-
10 Martha R. Baldwin, “Magnetism and the Anti-Copernican Polemic,” Journal
for the History of Astronomy 16 (1985), 155-174; Peter Dear, Discipline and Experience:
The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago, 1995), 63-67
11 Baldwin, “Magnetism,” 157; Dear also stresses Cabeo’s adherence to “proper
Aristotelian” methodology, Discipline and Experience, 64-66.
12 J. L. Heilbron, Electricity in the 17th and 18th Centuries (Berkeley/Los Angeles,
1979), 180-183.
13 On Cabeo’s relation to Galileo see: Ledo Stefanini, “1611: Mantova incrocio
di arte, scienza e politica,” Atti e memorie. Accademia nazionale virgiliana di scienze
lettere e arti, n.s. 71 (2003), 69-99; on his role in the discovery of the pendulum’s
isochronism see: Maria Teresa Borgato, “Riccioli e la caduta dei gravi,” in Giam-
battista Riccioli e il merito scientifico dei Gesuiti nell’età barocca, ed. Maria Teresa
Borgato (Firenze, 2002), 91-102; on his collaboration with Baliani see: Serge
Moscovici, L’Expérience du mouvement: Jean-Baptiste Baliani disciple et critique de Galilée
(Paris, 1967), 49ff; Maria Teresa Borgato, “Niccolò Cabeo tra teoria ed esperi-
menti: le leggi del moto,” in Gesuiti e università in Europa (secoli XVI-XVIII), ed. Gian
Paolo Brizzi and Roberto Greci (Bologna, 2002), 361-385; Borgato, “Riccioli e la
caduta dei gravi,” 85-91; Dear, Discipline and Experience, 67-76.
14 Niccolò Cabeo, Commentaria in libros Meteorologicorum (Rome, 1646), I, 6:
“Supponendum igitur est tres iam communiter ab omnibus distingui scientias
totales speculativas Methaphysicam, Physicam, & Mathematicam, quae dicuntur
scientiae totales.”
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erties of physical bodies and their effects, that is, “all of the
effects of those things that can be perceived,” and “the sensible
causes of all effects, which can be perceived by external sensa-
tion,” while “those [causes] that cannot be perceived do not
pertain to physica.”15 Equating the real with physical and material
objects, he contended that metaphysical concepts have no bear-
ing on our understanding of the natural world. Because the goal
of physica is to explain sensible causes and effects, Cabeo largely
appealed to observation, experience, and contrived experiments.
The experiential emphasis of the Commentaria was not lost on his
contemporaries. Marin Mersenne, in a letter to Athanasius Kircher,
written shortly after the Commentaria’s publication, stated: “what
[Cabeo] wrote on the Meteors is certainly beautiful, for he does
not follow the commonplaces of philosophers, but what he judges
best according to experiences.”16 Although Francis Bacon is of-
ten credited with initiating experimental natural philosophy, it
rose from more than one location and its inspiration was varied.
For Cabeo, who as far as I know did not read Bacon, experimen-
tal natural philosophy stemmed from the centuries-old tradition
of Aristotelian alchemy; he did not try to create a novum or-
ganum, but rather tried to use old foundations and new experi-
ences to revive an old science.
A new Aristotelian natural philosophy
Cabeo’s advocay of corpusclar matter theory and chymical inter-
ventions into nature underpinned an attempt to reform Aristotelian
natural philosophy. This reform took into account contemporary
theories and practices, but kept reading Aristotle as foundational.
15 Ibid., I: 9: “Omnes ergo illis effectus, qui sensu percipi possunt, & de facto
sensu percipiantur horum omnium effectuum cognoscendi ratio spectabit ad
Physicam, & ex complexione cognitionum harum proprietatum, & effectuum
integrabitur Physica, quae tota versatur in hoc ut ostendat causas sensibiles om-
nium effectuum, qui sensu externo percipi possunt, & quae sic percipi non pos-
sunt non spectabunt ad Physicam...”;
16 Marin Mersenne, Correspondance du P. Marin Mersenne, religieux minime, ed.
Cornélis de Waard and Armand Beaulieu (Paris, 1932-1988), XIV: 473, letter #
1514 (22 September 1646): “Certe pulcra sunt de Meteoris quae scripsit, neque
enim sequitur vulgus philosophorum, sed quod iuxta experientias optimum judi-
cat.” For his favorable view of this work, see also letter # 1528 to André Rivet (11
October 1646), XIV: 524: “Nous avons un nouveau commentaire en 2 volumes
sur les Meteores d’Aristote fort excellent, du Jesuiste Cabeus, imprimé à Rome...”
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As a result his natural philosophy appropriated recent discover-
ies, yet potentially remained palatable to conservatives. His re-
form was composed of two interrelated platforms. First, like so
many other seventeenth-century philosophers, he decried what
he understood to be the dependence on and faith in Aristotle’s
authority. Second, he maintained Aristotle’s injunction against
metabasis, i.e., the transfer of methods and models from one
subject to another, and from this concluded that physica should
be free of metaphysical and mathematical explanations.17 In
Cabeo’s eyes, Aristotle himself had been too occupied with
metaphysics, and dependence on his writings had caused Peri-
patetics to ignore physical objects, or to analyze nature using
metaphysical concepts. On the other hand, his attacks on mathe-
matics were directed at novatores, who in their use of mathemati-
cal demonstrations failed to show how these abstractions related
to physical causation.
Cabeo’s attacks on other Peripatetics is made complex by the
fact that he is one as well and insisted, despite some reserva-
tions, that an accurate understandings of Aristotle’s text, in this
case the Meteorology, had to constitute the starting point for physica.
Since philosophical truths, according to Cabeo, should be inde-
pendent “from authority,” and based instead on “evident rea-
son,”18 true philosophy must go beyond the acts of “reading (lectio),
commentary (commentatio), or speculation (speculatio).”19 Indeed,
other commentators have been led astray by trying to solve
Aristotle’s obscurities without personally experiencing nature and
thus adopted a religion (fides) of Aristotelianism rather than a
science (scientia) based on observation.20 He was particularly wary
of bibliolaters who thought that establishing the meaning of the
17 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 75a38-75b6. On the history of this prohibition
and its eventual rejection see: Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagi-
nation (Princeton, 1986), 299-327.
18 Cabeo, Commentaria, I, proemium [a7v]: “non ex eius auctoritate, quia ipse
dixit, sed ex evidenti ratione...”
19 Ibid., IV: 334: “Miror sane Philosophos nostros existimare se posse fieri
perfectos, sola lectione, & commentatione, seu speculatione...”
20 Ibid.: “Cum tamen tota physica observationibus innitatur. Quod si dicas, re
observationes ab aliis sumere, & illis experientias relinquere: scito, te illis etiam
scientiam relinquere, tibi fidem assumere. Nec enim unquam philosophiam ha-
bebis physicam, absque experimentis. Multa ergo dicit hic Aristoteles, & ex illo
sequaces describunt, quae obscura sunt, & difficultatem habent, & quia inter-
pretes noluerunt experiri, ne fortasse arguerentur falsitatis, & cogerentur fateri
errorem praeceptoris: cana, & inepta omnino adduxerunt.”
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text is the final goal. These adherents to Aristotle think that
“Aristotle always tells the truth,” and that “it is a kind of blas-
phemy to affirm that Aristotle did not tell the truth.”21 Cabeo’s
description of Peripatetics is hyperbole, having more in com-
mon with Galileo’s fictional Simplicio than with prominent
Peripatetics of the day. Even Cesare Cremonini, the Paduan philo-
sopher who gained notoriety for what he claimed to be literal
interpretations of Aristotle, did not maintain that all of Aristotle’s
precepts were true. In fact, in the prefaces to his commentaries
on the De caelo and De anima, he wrote provisos that these inter-
pretations were of Aristotle and not necessarily what he thought
to be true, although he perhaps included these warnings only to
escape ecclesiastical prosecution.22
Despite his reservations about other Peripatetics, Cabeo stressed
the importance of accurate analysis of Aristotle’s text: “it is pri-
mary to know what Aristotle said on each issue, to understand
thoroughly his words and the meaning of those words, and to
conceive with the entire mind the arguments, which he uses to
prove particular issues.”23 Thus a commentator should strive to
clarify the text as it stands, not by adding words and phrases,
which Cabeo claimed was unfortunately the custom.24 However,
the understanding of the precise meaning of the text is “pri-
mary,” and thus the starting point, but not the destination. This
21 Ibid., I: 12: “ita ut Blasphaemia quaedam sit apud ipsos affirmare Aristo-
telem verum non dicere...”; ibid, “enim semper Aristoteles veram dicet...”
22 Cesare Cremonini, Disputatio De caelo (Venice, 1613), 350: “Semper hoc
constans esto; nos hic non quaerere rei veritatem, at solum Aristotelis senten-
tiam.”; Idem, Expositio in III libros De anima, Biblioteca Marciana Ms lat. VI 190
(XVII) as transcribed in Ernst Renan, Averroès et l’averroïsme, 2nd ed., (Paris, 1861),
476-477: “Aristoteles enim unus est homo, et dicit Scriptura: Omnis homo men-
dax, Deus veritas; quare veritatem ex Deo ipso et ex sanctis hominibus, quid ex
Deo, locuti sunt accipere debeamus...”; “scitote tamen quod non sunt multa in
quibus Aristoteles dissentit a veritate, et illa non sunt ita demonstrata, ut possint
haberi demonstrationum resolutiones.” See also: Idem, Apologia dictorum Aristotelis:
De quinta caeli substantia (Venice, 1616), 4-5: “Sic est etiam de Aristotele, quem
non dico simpliciter veritatem attigisse, quippe qui erravit, quandocumque con-
tra fidem sensit...”
23 Cabeo, Commentaria, I, proemium [a7v]: “Primum est, quid in qualibet re
dixerit Aristoteles cognoscere, eiusque verba, & verborum sensus penitus in-
telligere, & rationes, quas ad singulas res probandas adducit, mente omnino
concipere.”
24 Ibid.: “Pro meo igitur captu quanta maxima potero claritate, Philosophi
sensum apertum reddam, & quia Aristotelis capita longiora mihi vedentur, per
textus distribuam, & ne sentiam interturbent inserta auctoris verba, adiectis lit-
terulis, ut fere moris est, textum appellabo.”
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is why Cabeo divided his work into lectiones, followed by quaes-
tiones. The former were intended to reveal Aristotle’s intent ac-
curately, while the latter aimed to go beyond Aristotle and search
out the truth unfettered by the demands of ancient authority
and bolstered by knowledge derived from the senses. Aristotle’s
doctrines are not “dogma brought down from the sky,” but if
“one wants to advance towards knowledge, one must examine
them against the standard of truth, discuss each unshrouded
proposition very accurately, expound the force of his reasoning,
and expose the causes brought forth from Aristotle himself.”25
According to Cabeo, many of Aristotle’s views could not be
accepted because he was “more accustomed to metaphysical
speculation, than to physical observation.”26 In the class of meta-
physical speculation, he included abstractions and the unneces-
sary deployment of scholastic logic that depended on reducing
things (res) to universal categories, differences, and divisions, all
three of which have no physical reality. He rejected metaphysical
entities as chimerical because they are neither material nor
physical.27 Cabeo’s attack on metaphysics has much in common
with the positions of later thinkers who were openly hostile to
Aristotelianism. Joseph Glanvill, for example, chastised metaphysical
entities as “chimaerical” because they cannot be observed.28 Robert
Boyle, who apparently read at least portions of the Commentaria,
called Cabeo an “inquisitive Peripatetic” and “one of the most
judicious” commentators because of his observation that faithful
25 Ibid.: “Hoc ubi egerit, hanc Aristotelis sententiam, non tamquam e caelo
delatum dogmam, debet venerari, nec tamquam rem sacrosanctam suscipere, si
nos ad scientiam deducere vult, sed ad veritatis normam examinare debet, accu-
ratissime propositionem ipsam nudam discutere, rationum momenta expendere,
causas ab ipso etiam Aristotele alatas perpendere.”
26 Ibid., IV: 418: “Sed etiam hic videtur Aristoteles magis metaphysicis spe-
culationibus assuetus, quam physicis observationibus.”; IV: 79-80: “unde cum
Aristoteles physicum agit, omnino antiquos sequitur, sed quia iste Philosophus
maxime pollebat ingenio metaphysico, & apprime arridebat philosophari per
metaphysicas abstractiones, reducendo semper res ad universalissimas, & me-
taphysicas rationes, ut constat in tota eius physica; imo & in tota morali, & poetica,
& rhetorica ipsa; semper enim res deducit ad differentias, divisiones, & meta-
physicas abstractiones.”; IV: 351: “omnino Aristotelis ingenium erat ad subtilitates
metaphysicas, & abstractiones: non concrescebat illa subtilitas ingenii, ut con-
crescunt physica.”
27 Ibid, I: 114: “sed videant ne physicam reliquant philosophiam, ut chimae-
ras sectentur metaphysicas.”; III: 406: “illud est materia, non chimaerica, sed
physica.”
28 Joseph Glanvill, Scepsis scientifica (London, 1661), 111.
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adherents to Aristotle use metaphysics as an interpretative crutch,
claiming that Aristotle shifts between “actu & potentia… to shift
off those Difficulties he could not clearly Explicate.”29 Boyle’s
complaints about scholastic philosophy touched on Cabeo’s major
themes. For both Boyle and Cabeo natural philosophy should
avoid metaphysics and be based on observations of the physical
world. Boyle wrote:
And indeed the doctrines of Forms & Qualities, and Generation & Corrup-
tion, and Alteration are wont to be treated of by Scholastical Philosophers,
in so obscure, so perplex’d, and so unsatisfactory a way, and their Discourses
upon these Subjects do consist so much more of Logical and Metaphysical
Notions & Niceties, then of Physical Observations and Reasonings…30
Therefore, blind faith in Aristotle and dishonest sophistry were
to blame for the frequent metaphysical interpretations of natu-
ral philosophy. Similarly, according to Cabeo, reasoning (ratio)
and especially experience of sensible causes were essential for
making progress in natural philosophy and freeing oneself from
the dogmatic faith of Aristotle.31 The concern with the unneces-
sary abysses of metaphysics, the physical world, and experience
is common to his earlier work. In the preface to the Philosophia
magnetica, he claimed that he did not “think that any person can
aspire to the dignity of being a philosopher, even if he should
muster up some metaphysical subtleties, unless he should have
accumulated in his mind the physical and sensible causes of
these things, which are produced daily by nature.”32 Thus his
reform was intended to correct both Aristotle’s commentators,
who were consumed by bookish reading, and Aristotle himself
who was consumed by metaphysics.
Cabeo’s distrust of metaphysical abstraction mirrored his skepti-
cism toward the application of mathematics to physics. While
29 Robert Boyle, Origin of Forms and Qualities in The Works of Robert Boyle, ed.
Michael Hunter and Edward B. Davis (London, 1999), 5:294-295.
30 Ibid., 5:289.
31 Cabeo, Commentaria, I:324: “... alii Philosophi causam inquirunt, suppo-
nentes rem esse verissimam, quasi Aristoteles a nullo unquam potuerit decepi.
Ego, vero, qui in rebus physicis, & in Philosophia non fide procedendum puto,
sed experientiis, & rationibus: nec video inter principia scientiarum poni fidem...”
32 Cabeo, Philosophia magnetica, [a3r]: “Nec enim puto philosophi personam
quemquam posse pro dignitate sustinere, etiam si metaphysicas quasdam sub-
tilitates percalleat; nisi illarum rerum, quae a natura quotidie passim producun-
tur, physicas, & sensibiles causas, in quibus ingenium acquiescat, possit afferre,
non quod illas metaphysicas speculationes non suspictam, non admirer, non toto
pectore hauriendas censeam;”
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recognizing the internal certainty of mathematical proof, he
maintained that nature could not be reduced to mathematical
forms.33 Cabeo’s doubts over the validity of mathematics have
their roots in positions on the epistemic status of mathematics
that were developed among Jesuits in the sixteenth century. By
the middle of the sixteenth century, questions on the certainty
of mathematical demonstration were proliferating throughout
Italy.34 The Jesuit Benito Pereira, in his frequently reprinted De
communibus omnium rerum naturalium principiis (1576), contended
that because quantity was distinct from sensible substances, mathe-
matics could not give demonstrations that were potissimae. Thus
he concluded that subjects that depended on the notion of
quantity, that is, mixed mathematics, were not proper sciences.35
Geronimo Hurtado, a student of Pereira, furthered this point:
“However much they are said to consider the formal cause, the
mathematical sciences do not consider truly and properly any
cause.”36 True sciences must go beyond mathematics and look to
sensible matter.
Mathematical explanations suffer because they, like metaphysical
speculations, do not consider physical things. According to Cabeo,
often the application of “quantity is not physical but metaphysi-
cal.” As a result of the gap between these abstractions and the
material world, mathematical explanations are unsatisfactoy. For
example, in his discussion of the rainbow, he conceded that
mathematical proofs are valid in terms of argument but that they
do not explain the facts of the rainbow in physical terms: “The
demonstrations are good and geometrical, but they do not ex-
plain the rainbow, nor the cause of its roundness, and they do
not address the issue, because perhaps these authors were too
pure mathematicians and did not adjust their proofs to accom-
modate physical things.”37 The modesty of physicists (physici) to
33 Ibid., 211: “Non possum hoc dictum ad Mathematicam redigere formam,
tum quia physicum totum hoc est negotium.”
34 For an overview of the history of this question in the sixteenth century, see:
Anna De Pace, Le matematiche e il mondo (Milan, 1993).
35 Rivka Feldhay, “The Use and Abuse of Mathematical Entities,” in Cambridge
Companion to Galileo, ed. Peter Machamer (Cambridge, 1998), 92-93.
36 From his Conclusiones mathematicae, 151, quoted in Romano Gatto, Tra scien-
za e immaginazione: Le matematiche presso il collegio gesuitico napoletano (1572-1670 ca.)
(Florence, 1994), 20.
37 Cabeo, Commentaria, III: 186: “Demonstrationes ergo bonae sunt & geo-
metricae; sed non explicant iridem, nec causam rotunditatis & non sunt ad rem,
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recognize the extent of their science is admirable. Cabeo wrote:
“But to the contrary, physicists do not dare to give judgment on
a mathematical proof, as I see so frequently happen with mixed
mathematicians.”38 In his eyes, mathematicians would do well to
follow Aristotle’s injunction against metabasis; they ought to keep
to mathematical issues. The subject of mathematics is not sen-
sible physical entities, and for the scope of Cabeo’s physica it was
fairly irrelevant. While the application of mathematics to the
natural world is often seen as a hallmark of the development of
new natural philosophies during the seventeenth century, it was
crucial neither to Bacon’s natural histories nor to many of the
developments in chymical theory and practice to which Cabeo
subscribed.39
Chymical corpuscularism
Cabeo used alchemical theory as a basis for physica because it
provided, instead of metaphysical principles, physical ones that
referred to sensible bodies; he thought its content was verifiable
by careful observation if not by experiments. Cabeo adopted the
physical principles of alchemical theory and used them to de-
velop a corpuscular matter theory independent from the con-
cept of substantial form, a concept that he considered metaphysical
and therefore beyond the boundaries of physica. In particular,
there are numerous affinities between Cabeo’s understanding of
hylomorphism and the matter theory put forth in Geber’s Summa
perfectionis, a work that Cabeo read and cited.40 Both Geber and
Cabeo used the position of particles instead of substantial forms
to explain the characteristics of material substances.41 Cabeo
& quia fortasse auctores nimis puri erant Mathematici, non adverterunt suas
demonstrationes rei physicae non accomdari.”
38 Ibid.: “Contra vero physici non sunt ausi iudicium ferre de demonstratione
mathematica, ut video frequenter contingere in mathematicis mixtis.” On mod-
esty as a virtue prized by Jesuit authors, see: Michael John Gorman, “Mathematics
and Modesty in the Society of Jesus: The Problems of Christoph Grienberger,” in
New Science and Jesuit Science: Seventeenth Century Perspectives, ed. Mordechai Fein-
gold (Dordecht, 2002), 1-121.
39 For mathematics and its relevance to chymistry see: Newman and Principe,
Alchemy Tried in the Fire, 58-68.
40 William R. Newman, The Summa Pefectionis of Pseudo-Geber: A Critical Edition,
Translation and Study (Leiden, 1991). Cabeo cited Geber at Commentaria, IV: 356.
41 On Geber’s abandonment of the concept of substantial form see: William
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understood substances to be composed of “subtle and spiritous
parts” that are “fixed” in a wet medium, which serves as a “union”
by employing links (vincula) composed of stable thick parts. The
spirits are composed of small and active parts of matter, while
that which is fixed is “thick, still, earthy, ashy, solid, never evapo-
rates,”42 and “always remains heavy and falling.”43 Despite being
material, according to Cabeo the “spiritous part should be called
called form,” because it is responsible for the union of the other
particles. Instead of matter, privation, and form, we are left with
a wet medium equivalent to “union,” heavy and fixed parts (matter),
and spirits (form).44
Cabeo’s debts to alchemy did not end with Geber; he also
adopted Paracelsus’ theory that metals are composed of salt,
mercury, and sulfur. The wet medium corresponds to mercury,
the spirits are sulfur, and the fixed parts are salt.45 For Paracelsus
the three components of matter corresponded to the Trinity
and thus were imbued with religious meaning. To the contrary,
Cabeo stressed the physical nature of these parts: “these are the
three true physical principles.”46 He emphasized that the spiritous
and fixed parts were “physical and real.”47 They are also sensible,
and Cabeo claimed that he learned of their properties through
repeated observation. Although spirits are furtive and “often elude
the senses,” he informed the reader that these parts of matter
are observable whenever the bonds of a mixture are destroyed
and the spirits fly away.48
R. Newman, Promethean Ambitions: Alchemy and the Quest to Perfect Nature (Chicago,
2004), 74-76.
42 Cabeo, Commentaria, I: 14: “Est praeterea altera pars fixa, crassa, manens,
terrea, cinericia, consistens, quae nunquam evanescit.”
43 Ibid., I: 113: “semper remanet gravis, & cadens.”
44 Ibid., I: 407: “in universum pars spiritosa dicetur forma, fixa est vera mate-
ria, humiditas est physica, & vera unio, qua forma unitur materiae.”
45 Ibid., I: 406: “a sapientioribus pars spiritosa dicitur sulphur; fixa dicitur sal,
& humiditas vocatur, Mercurius.”; I: 114: “Humiditas ergo, quam, si non haberes
aliam vocem, a Chymicorum vocibus vocabis Mercurium, est vinculum illius, &
ligamen, quo sulphur, hoc est spiritosa, & vivida illa pars, quae in resolutione abit
in auras, & subtile effluvium, coniungitur cum sale, hoc est cum parte illa fixa,
stabili, & consistente, quae semper remanet, & in perfecta resolutione nunquam
resolvitur.”
46 Ibid., I: 406: “haec sunt tria vera principia physica.”
47 Ibid., I: 114: “physicae, & reales sunt partes...”
48 Ibid., I: 14: “Probatur hoc experientia quoties quamcumque ratione des-
truitur quodlibet mixtum semper duas istas partes observabis, alteram quae avolat,
alteram quae refidet, & quamvis spiritosa illa furtim se subducat, & sensum saepe
esm11-2.pmd 2/24/2006, 1:51 PM13
craig martin14
Cabeo’s commitment to using only real and physical entities
greatly altered the traditional way of understanding substantial
change, generation and corruption, and the nature of mixture.
For Aristotle, bodies were composed out of mixtures of the four
traditional elements. When completely mixed, a new substantial
form either supervened on or replaced the forms of the ele-
ments. Mixtures were considered to be perfect, when the super-
vening substantial form was fully realized, and imperfect when
only partially.49 For Cabeo, however, generation, corruption, and
the perfection of mixtures were considered exclusively in terms
of the three kinds of matter. Generation is the result of spiritous
particles becoming fixed in a medium; and, destruction occurs
when these particles depart or fly away from the heavier particles
and their binds dissolve. True physical generation occurs when
the volatile subtle parts that were once separate from the fixed
parts are glued by the intervening humor. “This,” wrote Cabeo
“is a true physical mixture, and it becomes perfect, when there
is a concoction of its wetness, by which the spiritous parts are
joined with the fixed.”50 Perfection is not the realization of an
essence or purpose but rather the result of the firmness of the
link: “The perfect composition [perfecta compositio] of all sublunary
substances is such because their parts are joined with a perfect
link.” The stronger the link, the more perfect the mixture.51 On
the other hand, the corruption of substances is caused by the
weakening of the binds that cause the “spirits and subtler parts
to separate from the corporeal, and the thick and still ones to
eludat.” Ibid.: “Mihi sensata experientia ostendit omnia mixta constare ex duplici
Physicae parte quarum una est subtilis, spiritosa, quae facile in auras abit.”
49 For Aristotle’s distinction between mixture and combination, see: Harold
H. Joachim, “Aristotle’s Conception of Chemical Combination,” Journal of Philol-
ogy 29 (1904), 72-86. For early modern debates over the destinction of these terms
see: Christoph Lüthy, “An Aristotelian Watchdog as Avant-Garde Physicist: Julius
Caesar Scaliger,” Monist 84 (2001), 542-561.
50 Cabeo, Commentaria, IV: 84: “Haec est vera generatio physica, de quae hic
Philosophi, quod nimirum partibus fixis; iterum volatiles aliae separatae adiun-
gantur, & convenienti humore adglutinentur, & haec vera physica mixtio, &
perficitur, ut constabit ex infra dicendis, concoctione illius humidi, quo partes
spiritosae, cum fixis coniunguntur, & tota perfectio, vel imperfectio mixti consistit
in ista meliori, vel peiori concotione.
51 Ibid., IV: 98: “Tota rerum sublunarium perfecta compositio in eo consistit,
ut partes sint perfecto vinculo copulatae, & quo magis coniunctae fuerint, & mi-
nus separabiles, etiam ab efficaciori agente, diceretur certe res magis perfecta, in
ratione unius, & compositi; istam autem partium compositionem, seu colliga-
tionem, dixi iam saepe fieri in humido.”
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descend, while the subtle ones go up into the air.”52 Neither
generation nor corruption truly adds or subtracts anything; they
are merely the division and union of parts.53
Geber similarly described composition in terms of the strength
of the resulting union that prevents the substance’s particles
from separation. Cabeo’s use of the word compositio also reso-
nates with Geber, and reveals that Cabeo’s mixtures, just as Geber’s,
were not true mixtures, that is, they were compounds in which
the parts can be differentiated.54 Rather than being a truly
homeomerous substance, a mixture or a composition has distin-
guishable parts: spirit, wet particles, and heavy particles, all of
which are bound together. They unite, but they do not change
their substance. Using another Gerberian term, Cabeo wrote that
a mixture is formed through the combinations of the smallest
particles (per minima permixta), as he understood that only when
the spirit had thoroughly penetrated the wet medium could the
fixed parts become linked.55
As a result of his commitment to explaining the characteristics
of all sublunary bodies throught the combining of corpuscles,
the common understanding of form as essence was mistaken, in
52 Ibid., IV: 80: “Dico ergo, ut saepe indicatum est, & non semel etiam fusius
explicatum, rem aliquam corrumpi, nihil aliud esse, quam ex attenuatione hu-
midi, quasi ex dissolutione vinculi separari spiritus, & partes subtiliores, a cor-
poralibus: & crassas, & consistentes concidere, subtiles in auras abire.”
53 Ibid.: “ut in corruptione nihil deperditur, sed quae erant unita dividuntur;
in generatione nihil producitur, sed quae erant divisa uniuntur.”
54 See: Newman, “Experimental Corpuscular Theory,” 294.
55 Cabeo, Commentaria, IV: 99: “Dum ergo partes spiritosae, ut ad rem revertur,
alicuius compositi sunt commixtae cum fixo, sed humidum remanet adhuc aqu-
eum, facile calore avolat aqua, & ita compositum dissolvitur: unde si mixtio dicitur
perfecta, & mixtum perfectum, quando non qualibet vi potest dissolvi, debet eo
res redigi, ut non ita facile humidum possit avolare: debet ergo illa humiditas,
quae dicebatur humiditas quanta, & aquea, quia non erat incorporata partibus
componentibus, sed solum quasi localiter, & per minima permixta, bene in-
corporari, & uniri, interna penetratione, & identificatione, ut iam fiat humidum
quale, & oleaginosum, & hic transitus fit per calorem semper, nec alio fere modo
natura hoc assequitur, qui calor in principio debet esse temperatus, & moderatus;
dum enim illo moderato calore attenuatur humiditas, ex una parte non avolat,
quia non redditur nimis tenuis; ex alia redditur magis apta, ut spiritus illam
pervadere possint, tota sua substantia: & ita illa humiditas redditur magis spi-
ritualis, & redditur ipsa magis apta, ut intime pervadet ipsum corpus, & acquirit
ingressum, dum redditur magis penetrativa, & subtilis, & ita illi intime partes fixae
copulantur, & dum hoc perpetua & continuata actione fit, hoc modo corpus sit
spirituale, & spiritus corporeus, & dum sic humiditas perficitur, & intimius unitur
cum partibus, dicitur fieri concoctionem, proprie & vere.”
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Cabeo’s view; rather forms are a certain type of real, physical,
material entities, namely spirits and vapors that have various powers
and virtues.56 He dismissed the Stagirite’s understanding of sub-
stantial form, because it “is a metaphysical essence and formula
according to Aristotle; it is not a physical entity”57 and therefore
has no role in natural philosophy. The twin concepts of form
and privation, as traditionally understood, are also rejected, “one
of which is nothing, the other metaphysical.”58 Cabeo’s corpus-
cular philosophy redefined form as active and physical. He wrote:
But the true physical form is that vapid and subtle spirit, which gives deter-
mined being to each thing. For a thing is this or that because it is animated
by this or that spirit. From this this [spirit], there is an active force of such
quantity and of such kind; and just as the diversity of the sublunary objects
comes from these diverse spirits, which are implanted in them, the diversity
of faculties, properties, operations and virtues comes from these. This is true
act, this true form, not a metaphysical reason conceived by the mind, but
the physical principle of the faculties.59
What Aristotle called form, and what some consider metaphysi-
cal, is in fact a specific kind of body that unifies the substance.
It is a spirit, a vapor that consists of small parts. Like the Stoics,
Cabeo’s form is an active, and entirely material, force that or-
ders the world and its contents.60
56 I disagree with Ugo Baldini’s interpretation of Cabeo’s hylomorphism.
Baldini argues that Cabeo thought that forms and matter were not names of spe-
cific physical bodies and that they had a metaphysical meaning: they were names
of names, or names of classes. While all categories are in a sense metaphysical,
form and matter are categories of physical substances for Cabeo, whereas for most
Aristotelians, substantial forms are metaphysical essences of substances. Cf. Ugo
Baldini, “L’evoluzione della ‘fisica’ dei gesuiti in Italia, 1550-1700: un approccio
strutturale,” in Saggi sulla cultura della Compagnia di Gesù (secoli XVI-XVIII) (Padua,
2000), 275-277.
57 Ibid., IV: 80: “& sic fortasse forma substantialis, est essentia & ratio meta-
physica apud Aristotelem. Non entitas physica.”
58 Ibid., I: 406: “non forma, & privatio, quorum alterum nihil est, alterum quid
metaphysicum.”
59 Ibid., III: 4: “forma vero physica est ille, spiritus vapidus, & subtilis, ille enim
est, qui dat rei unicuique determinatum esse. Ideo enim res est talis, quia tali
spiritu animatur. Ab isto est vis activa, tanta, & talis; & sicuti diversitas harum
rerum sublunarium provenit a diversis istis spiritus, qui rebus inditi sunt; ita
diversitas facultatum, proprietatum, operationum, virtutum, ab iisdem prodit. Hic
vero verus actus, haec vera forma, non metaphysica, mente concepta ratio, sed
physicum principium facultatum.”
60 Cabeo does not use the world “pneuma,” but there are similarities between
his form and that of the Stoics, see: Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, ed. Hans Friedrich
August von Arnim (Leipzig, 1903-1924), 439-462. For Stoic influences in the
seventeenth century, see: Peter Barker, “Stoic Contributions to Early Modern
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The innovations in Cabeo’s matter theory did not end in his
rejection of the traditional understanding of substantial form;
he also rejected the four traditional elements and integrated the
Paracelsian prima tria with the more Aristotelian earth, water,
and spirit. He claimed that his use of only three elements was
not a refinement of Aristotelian theory or a new philosophy, but
came from the Philosopher himself. He wrote: “This is true
Peripatetic doctrine, here expressly handed over by Aristotle, so
that you do not think that I have forged a new philosophy, but
I repeat the very thing from Aristotle which Aristotle took from
the ancients.”61 The evidence in this case is textual, as Cabeo
took a unique interpretative position. The supporting passage,
which comes from the fourth book of the Meteorology, reads:
Therefore, the homeomerous bodies both in plants and animals consist
of water and earth. And what are metals, such as gold, & silver, and
whatever else of this sort, [consist] of these [water and earth] and an exha-
lation, either of which, is enclosed [within the earth] as is stated in other
places.62
Equating the circling vapors, described as smoky and moist that
Aristotle called the double exhalations and considered respon-
sible for atmospheric and subterranean change, with spirits, and
taking the phrase “homeomerous bodies” to mean “all homeo-
merous bodies,” Cabeo concluded that all sublunary substances
are composed out of earth (fixed parts), water (the wet me-
dium), and the double exhalations (spirits), and that these are
the “true elements.” He wrote: “I think that Aristotle, whatever
other interpreters say, spoke universally about all things, not
just about some, and he concludes that all homeomerous bodies
are made of four bodies, earth, water, and the double exhala-
Science,” in Atoms, Pneuma, Tranquillity: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European
Thought, ed. Margaret J. Osler (Cambridge, 1991), 135-154; Gad Freudenthal,
“Clandestine Stoic Concepts in Mechanical Philosophy: the Problem of Electrical
Attraction,” in Renaissance and Revolution: Humanists, Scholars, Craftsmen, and Natu-
ral Philosophers in Early Modern Europe, ed. J. V. Field and Frank A. J. L. James
(Cambridge, 1993), 161-172.
61 Cabeo, Commentaria, IV: 342: “ista est vera doctrina peripatetica, hic ex-
presse a Aristotele tradita; ut videas me novam non procudere philosophiam: sed
eandem, quam Aristoteles desumpsit ab antiquis ab Aristot. repetere.”
62 384b30-34. Cabeo used William Moerbeke’s translation: Commentaria, IV:
342: Text XXV: “Ex aqua igitur, & terra, similarium partium corpora constant &
in plantis & in animalibus. Et quae metalla sunt. Ut aurum, & argentum, &
quaecunque alia talia. & ex ipsis & exhalatione ea, quae utriusque, inclusa, sicut
dictum est in aliis.”
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tion.”63 For Cabeo, the double exhalations are the spirits that
define the diverse number of sublunary bodies through active
powers.64
While his reframing of the Aristotelian elements depended on
textual explication, more often Cabeo appealed to the sensible
world to support his corpuscular matter theory. Knowledge of
spirits is gained from experience, albeit not experimentation.
Vegetable spirits unite the material of plants and give it life, just
as animal spirits, “as experience establishes,” give life to ani-
mals.65 Upon death these spirits break up and separate them-
selves from the body, although Cabeo cautioned that “it may not
that the [intact] soul of a horse or a dog flies away, rather the
spirits having been broken-up move away and disperse.”66 The
existence of spontaneous generation supports these claims, ac-
cording to Cabeo. He argued that animals that are produced
without seed are created in dung, which contains animal spirits
that had previously been separated from living animals. Simi-
larly, worms are generated out of rotting meat, which is “filled
with animal spirits” that still adhere to the carcasses of the once
living organisms.67
Cabeo’s appeal to simple everyday experience in establishing
the existence of vegetable and animal spirits is not indicative of
the varied range of observations and experience he utilized in
his Commentaria. Experience for Aristotle and most Aristotelians
63 Cabeo, Commentaria, IV: 342: “puto ego Aristotelem, quicquid dicant alii
Interpraetes, loqui universaliter de omnibus, non de aliquibus tantum, & con-
cludit, quod omnia corpora similaria constant ex quatuor corporibus, ex terra, &
aqua, & ex duplici exhalatione.”
64 Ibid., IV: 346: “Nam diversitas specifica corporum pendet ex diversitate
harum partium, & praesertim, ex diversitate illorum halituum, quos ponit Aris-
toteles quamvis enim uno nomine communi vocentur halitus, haec tamen est
ratio generica, & in singulis rebus diversae speciei sunt, isti halitus: & licet etiam
pars fixa fortasse sit diversa; tamen istae halitus certe est diversus, & ex istis vere
constituuntur res eiusdem vel diversae speciei. Non a rationibus abstractis per
intellectum metaphysice...”
65 Ibid., IV: 81: “Ex animali expirant spiritus animales, & sensitivi, per con-
tinuam transpirationem corporum, ut constat experientia...”
66 Ibid.: “Cum enim dissolvitur aliquod vivens, & aliquod animal, id contingit,
ut dictum est, quia illis spiritus, qui coniuncti cum illo fixo, formabant illud
vivens, attenato humido separantur, & avolant; non avolant autem coniuncti, &
ita non potest dici avolare anima equi, aut canis sed avolant divulsi, & distantur,
ac disperduntur.”
67 Ibid., IV: 82: “Hinc vides cur facilius generentur vermes ex carne putres-
cente aut ex simili materia; quia, scilicet, illa materia est magis referta spiritibus
animalibus.”
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was a broad category that included commonplace or quotidian
experiences, which included observational facts that were thought
to be accepted universally. Additionally the category of experi-
ence included other people’s experiences or accounts of them
found in authoritative books; an experience cited need not be
based on the author’s own observation. Cabeo, however, dis-
counted the role of everyday experience (experientia quotidiana),
and chastised Aristotle for his dependence on it. Instead he
claimed: “A philosopher will never become a scientific physicist
(physicus scientificus) only by reading books of philosophy, unless
he considers nature, and takes up experiments (experimenta
sumat).”68 Thus he urged natural philosophers to rely on their
own observations and actively experience and intervene in na-
ture instead of relying uniquely on experiences contained in
texts.
Both Renaissance Aristotelians and seventeenth-century Jesu-
its have been credited with promoting empiricism in natural
philosophy. Eckhard Kessler has argued that a movement away
from metaphysics toward experiential knowledge characterizes a
number of thinkers participating in or influenced by Renais-
sance Aristotelianism, while Peter Dear has located the rise of
mathematical experimentalism in the works of various seven-
teenth-century Jesuits.69 Cabeo’s reliance on chymical testing and
experience differs significantly from both of these groups.
Dear contends that a group of Jesuits, inspired by a reading of
Posterior Analytics 2.19, emphasized the role of sensation in form-
ing universal concepts that were considered the basis of scien-
tific knowledge.70 Among some of these Jesuits, this interest in
experience and experimentalism became intertwined with a re-
liance on mathematical proof to determine certainty. Again, Cabeo
does not fit well with this group. First, while maintaining the
68 Ibid., IV: 353: “nec Philosophus erit unquam physicus scientificus, solum
legendo libros philosophorum, nisi ipsam naturam consideret, & experimenta
sumat.”
69 On the division between metaphysical and empirical versions of Aristotle
during the Renaissance, see: Eckhard Kessler, “Metaphysics or Empirical Science?
The Two Faces of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy in the Sixteenth Century,” in
Renaissance Readings of the Corpus Aristotelicum, ed. Marianne Pade (Copenhagen,
2001), 79-101. See Antonino Poppi, Introduzione all’aristotelismo padovano, 2nd ed.,
(Padova, 1991), 13-44, for a characterization of Paduan Aristotelianism as pri-
vileging experience at the expense of metaphysics.
70 Dear, Discipline and Experience, 42-46.
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importance of induction, he rejected the importance of using
logic and forming universals in physica, thereby limiting the need
to appeal to the Posterior Analytics. Second, Cabeo distrusted the
mixing of the mathematical with the sensible worlds. His empiri-
cism derived instead from the Geberian alchemical tradition.
Both medieval and early modern practitioners of alchemy had
developed techniques of assaying and contrived interventions
into nature that were integrated with Aristotelian concepts.71 It
is in this tradition that Cabeo urged scientific physicists to take
up experiments, so that by doing their own laboratorial research
they could understand the works of nature. In Baconian-sound-
ing language he urged the use of experiments in order to break
away from bookish knowledge and directly confront the natural
world. He claimed that to learn the components of some sub-
stance, the surer method involves looking at the substance itself
rather than to consult others; and it is even surer, he suggested,
“to penetrate to the interior of nature.”72
Accordingly, some of his experiments set out to correct Aristotle.
For example, Aristotle explained the ability of wax and metal to
compress upon pressure by the presence of invisible pores into
which the sensible parts recede upon pressure. Cabeo rejected
Aristotle’s supposed claim that the entire body becomes smaller.
To be fair, Aristotle did not actually contend that the size of
metal changes in such circumstances.73 Nevertheless, according
to Cabeo, he erred because he was not sophisticated in making
observations: “what Aristotle says is based on everyday experi-
ence (experientia quotidiana), which we must not defer to because
of what is said by someone else.”74 In his view, a more sophisti-
71 William R. Newman, “Art, Nature, and Experiment among some Aristote-
lian Alchemists,” in Texts and Contexts in Ancient and Medieval Science, ed. Edith
Sylla and Michael McVaugh (Leiden, 1997), 305-317; William R. Newman, “Ex-
perimental Corpuscular Theory;” id., Promethean Ambitions, 238-289.
72 Cabeo, Commentaria, I: 12: “Hoc non tam ex libris, aut dictis sapientum,
quam ex oculari Philosophia dicere possumus, dum enim quaero ex qua re ali-
quid constet, & ex quo componatur tutius fortasse erit rem intueri, quam aliquem
interrogare, in hoc enim non quaerimus placita hominum, sed naturae opus.
Verum quidem est, si non valemus per nos ipso hoc investigare, vel de nostris
experimentis diffidimus aliorum observationibus insistendum, & experientias
observandas; caeterum sensu, quo manu ducent ad naturae penetralia pervenire
tutissimum est...”
73 Mete. IV, 386a17ff.
74 Ibid., IV: 393: “nam etiam ferrum est pressibile, & signabile, quid, quid dicat
Aristoteles, ut constat experientia quotidiana, quam non debemus deferere prop-
ter dictum alicuius hominis.”
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cated test reveals that the body does not in fact contract. He
argued that compressed bodies expand in the opposite direction
of the pressure so that there is no sensible diminishment in
magnitude. He described his experiment as such:
I have proven this by experiments on lead and on other metals, by testing
the magnitude of a lead ball with water, as has been described in other
places. If it is beaten into a thin sheet, and again its magnitude is tested,
there will be no loss at all of its magnitude from the change of shape made
by the contusion. But it will conserve the same magnitude in the thin sheet,
which it possessed as a ball. And this is true, and derived from experiment,
for this fact neither must Aristotle be consulted, nor any other philosopher,
but experience itself.75
Thus, Cabeo claimed to show that metals do not compress inter-
nally, but only change shape.
At times Cabeo’s experimental method was imprecise and broad
despite his call for active intervention into nature. While he
stressed individual experiences and did not develop a system for
collective experimentation, he agreed with some of the observa-
tional results of his contemporaries, particularly results from
astronomy. For example, he accepted the existence of sunspots,
new stars, and superlunary location of comets76 and was particu-
larly impressed by the replicability of the observations of Tycho
Brahe, whom he claimed had been capable of making his mea-
surements “not once, or twice, but as frequently as needed.”77
Nevertheless he insisted that descriptions of observations in books
could not be trusted completely. Even one’s own observations
and experiments are imperfect and their results liable to correc-
tion. He admitted that if someone should put forth better ex-
periments than previously conducted he would change his mind,
75 Ibid.: “Probavi hoc experientia in plumbo, & in aliis metallis, explorata
enim per aquam, ex alibi dictis, globi plumbei magnitudine. Si contundatur in
laminam, & iterum exporetur eius magnitudo, constabit nihil penitus magni-
tudinis esse deperditum, ex mutatione figurae, per contusionem facta; sed ean-
dem magnitudinem conservare in lamina, quam possidebat in globo. & hoc est
verum, & constat experientia, nec de hac re consulendus est Aristoteles, aut alius
philosophus, sed experientia ipsa.”
76 Ibid., I: 16: “ex modernis omnes, qui putant ex novis Phaenomenis, ex
cometis, & novis stellis, ex maculis Solis, & aliis observari in caelo mutationes.”
77 Ibid., I, 172: “Ex quo constat ipsum mensurasse singulorum planetarum
distantiam a terra, non semel, aut bis, sed frequentissime quantum requirebatur,
ut posset pronuntiare, quando nam sint in maxima elongatione a terra, quando
in minima, & quanta sit haec distantia.” See: Dear, Discipline and Experience, 127-
129, for Cabeo’s privileging of the replicability of experiences.
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because experimental conclusions are not proven to the same
extent that mathematical propositions are.78
While the replicability of Tycho’s observations was attractive,
Cabeo championed above all chymical practice as ideal for pen-
etrating into nature because of its ability to find the principles
of nature by “dissolving things and disjoining their composing
parts.” Alchemists were “ true physical philosophers” (veri Philosophi
physici).79 The breaking down of substances illuminated their
internal composition. Cabeo described his own attempts to break
down substances, which confirmed his belief that matter was
composed of thick and subtle parts. For example, puzzled by
what causes lightning to fall to the earth, he attempted to illus-
trate that previously invisible heavy matter emerges from some
substances when burnt. Arguing that it is the impetus of these
partes crassiores that causes lightning’s rapid descent to the earth,
he offered the reader an experiment, which he claimed to have
performed in front of Duke Ferdinando Gonzaga. By heating
purged saltpeter and submerging it in water, Cabeo claimed to
show that previously occluded thick parts emerged, resulting in
a heavy residue, thereby offering an analogy to the physical changes
of lightning.80 In another example, Cabeo recommended ars
sublimatoria to break down oil into its wet medium and a powder.
While he did not narrate the perfomance of experiment, as in
the previous example, he noted that this process was “observed
by an exact experiment (experimenta),” and then cited the chymical
author Joannes Mylius as also having known this procedure.81
78 Cabeo, Philosophia magnetica (Ferrara, 1629), 195: “Sed si quis prius meliora,
& magis experimentis congruentia attulerit; etiam ego libenter sententiam mu-
tabo; nec enim ista, ut mathematice demonstrata profero.” Cf. Peter Dear, “Jesuit
Mathematical Science and the Reconstitution of Experience in the Early Seven-
teenth Century.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 18 (1987), 172.
79 Cabeo, Commentaria, IV: 244: “puto illos [Chimicos] esse veros Philosophos
physicos, qui ex propriis principiis rerum naturas venantur. nec potest quis melius
scire, ex quibus nam res constent, tamquam ex elementis, quam si res ipsas
dissolvat, & partes componentes disiungat.”
80 Ibid., III: 26-27: “Hac occasione do tibi lector pulcherrimum experimen-
tum, & eius subtexo rationem, ut videas spiritum tenuem, si inflammetur, non
habere sensibilem impetum, nisi dum coniungitur cum materia aliquanto cras-
siore, Summe salnitrum repurgatum, & in crucibulo igne fusionis accende...” For
a similar chymical explanation of lightning and thunder, see: Daniel Sennert,
Epitome naturalis scientiae (Oxford, 1632), 267-268.
81 Ibid., IV: 315: “& hoc exacta experientia observatum est, & notavit etiam
Milius, in sua Basilica chymica.”
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While it has been argued that there was insufficient empirical
evidence for seventeenth-century atomism and corpuscularism,
Cabeo would have disagreed. Like the rest of his physica, his
matter theory derived from his interactions with the sensible
realm.82
The application of corpuscular materialism and its observa-
tional basis, however, had their limit, namely the human soul, a
realm in which experimentation is difficult. According to Cabeo,
“In mankind, not only are there these spiritous substances [ani-
mal and vegetable] but there is also another spiritual substance,
which is not spiritous and vapid, but is truly in its substantial
being something altogether different from body.”83 Unfortunately,
the ramifications of this dualism are not discussed, as he left
those for discussions of “the books of the De anima,” of which he
authored none. What remains clear is that for Cabeo all sub-
stances from the lowest up to but not including the human soul
were generated from the position and combination of thin vapid
parts, thick parts, in a watery medium.
Conclusion
At first glance, Cabeo’s corpuscularism, his rejection of substan-
tial forms, and his insistence on using three Paracelsian ele-
ments seem to be far removed from the exigencies of commenting
on Aristotle. It is tempting to ask: What does any of this have to
do with Aristotle? The answer is comes from his selection of the
Meteorology; Cabeo, although he thought experiential evidence
was paramount, also believed he had support in Aristotle’s own
writings. The ability of Cabeo to produce a reformed Aristote-
82 Christoph Meinel, “Early 17th-century Atomism: Theory, Epistemology, and
the Insufficiency of Experiment,” Isis 79 (1988), 68-103; Catherine Wilson, “Cor-
puscular Effluvia: Between Imagination and Experiment,” in Wissensideale und
Wissenskulturen in der frühen Neuzeit, ed. Wolfgang Detel and Claus Zittel (Berlin,
2002), 161-184, esp. 169.
83 Cabeo, Commentaria, IV: 82: “In homine vero, non solum sunt istae substan-
tiae spiritosae, sed est praeterea alia substantia spiritualis, quae non est spiritosa,
& vapida, sed est vere in suo esse substantiali aliquid omnino diversum a corpore,
& substantia spiritualis, quae, quia unitur corpori ad complendum principium
unius operationis, ad quam operationem necessario praerequiritur corpus, & quia
ex sua natura est talis, & facta est ut uniatur corpori, ad perficiendam istam
operationem; ideo dicitur forma informans & vere est informans, & ens incom-
pletum, in ratione illius principii, sed haec pluribus ad libros de anima.”
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lian natural philosophy removed from metaphysical and math-
ematical speculation depended on his choice of text. That one
of his two published works was on the Meteorology was both slightly
unusual and an important step to transforming Aristotelian natural
philosophy into a field concerned with the physical and sensible.
Because of its dependence on material and efficient causation
the Meteorology is perhaps the most suitable of Aristotle’s books
for creating an Aristotelian natural philosophy strictly concerned
with the material world. Aristotle argued that material and effi-
cient causes were the best explanations for changes in the sublunary
region and omitted explanations dependent on formal and final
causes, the very explanations that were the targets for Descartes
and Bacon, among others.84 Choosing the Meteorology as the basis
for Aristotelian natural philosophy, was most likely a conscious
choice to replace the Physics. The topics of the Meteorology in-
clude the motion of the sun, the double exhalations that cause
atmospheric changes, the effects of heat and cold on material
substances, the secondary properties of substances, in sum sen-
sible things; on the other hand, the Physics is concerned with the
conceptual tools to understand nature. Thus in this work Aristotle
wrote on a large number of abstract concepts, such as the defi-
nition of nature, change, matter and form, potency and act, the
four causes, time, space, continuity. Cabeo was fully aware that
interpretations of the Physics, unlike those of the Meteorology,
necessarily must address numerous topics beyond the sensible
realm.85
Moreover, by exclusively commenting on the Meteorology, Cabeo
was actively subverting the commentary tradition of Jesuits dur-
ing the late Renaissance, which had increasingly emphasized
metaphysics. Leading scholastic authors such as Benito Pereira,
Suárez, Toletus, and Fonseca did not comment on this work and
instead wrote extensively on ontology and natural theology.86
84 Aristotle, Meteorology, 339a20-33.
85 Cabeo, Commentaria, I, 9: “si non sint sensibiles in se non erunt causae
Physicae, neque vero aliquem moveat, quod videat in libris Physicorum a Philo-
sopho, aliquando aliqua examinari, quae sensibilia non sunt.”
86 For the increased interest in metaphysics among Iberian Jesuits see: Charles
H. Lohr, “Les jésuites et l’aristotélisme du XVIe siècle,” in Les jésuites à la Renais-
sance: Système éducatif et production du savoir, ed. Luce Giard (Paris, 1995), 79-91;
Charles H. Lohr, “Metaphysics,” in Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed.
Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, and Jill Kraye (Cambridge,
1988), 537-638, esp. 606-620.
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Thus his book was an attempt to correct the “many Peripatetics
occupied in these metaphysical subtleties [who] do not read
these books [the Meteorology].”87 By commenting on the Meteorol-
ogy, Cabeo could both promote his version of Aristotelian chymistry
and easily engage with recent developments in natural philoso-
phy.
One does not necessarily associate the field of meteorology
with the most significant developments in natural philosophy
during the seventeenth century, or really for any century. The
lack of ready associations between great changes in science and
meteorology, however, is unwarranted. Aristotelian meteorology
was defined as the study of the area between the moon and the
center of the earth where the elements were in a state of con-
stant flux, in contrast to the celestial regions where bodies were
unchanging and moved regularly. A number of the challenges to
Aristotelian philosophy were based on undermining the distinc-
tion between sublunary and superlunary. These challenges in-
cluded Galileo’s discovering of sunspots and seemingly terrestrial
features, such as mountains, on the moon, and the contention
that comets were celestial bodies. Other notable contestations
against Ptolemaic geocentrism, such as Galileo’s explanation of
the tides, were meteorological. Thus a commentary on the Me-
teorology allowed Cabeo to address many of these issues, and in
fact he accepted that the heavens were subject to generation and
corruption on the basis of observed sunspots, comets, and new
stars.88 Moreover, Cabeo’s use of the Meteorology as a vehicle for
the reformulation of natural philosophy was not unique for the
seventeenth century: Descartes’ Les Météores was an attempt to
provide an alternative to the Coimbra College’s fully Aristotelian
87 Cabeo, Commentaria, IV: 352: “Sed istos libros non legunt multi peripatetici
occupati in illis subtilitatibus metaphysicis.”
88 For his acceptance of the corruptibility of the heavens see: Cabeo, Com-
mentaria, I: 15-17. Cabeo addressed sunspots in that quaestio at Commentaria, I: 17;
see Commentaria, I: 170-179 for a discussion of Tycho’s and Scipione Chiara-
monti’s understandings of comets; Chiaramonti, who defended the position that
comets are sublunary, responded to Cabeo’s criticism in his: De sede sublunari
cometarum et novorum phenomenon libri duo: in primo continetur defensio sententiae suae
ab oppugnationibus P. Nicolai Cabaei (Forlì, 1648). For Tycho’s status among Jesuits
see: Michel-Pierre Lerner, “L’entrée de Tycho Brahe chez les jésuites ou le chant
du cygne de Clavius,” in Les jésuites à la Renaissance: Système éducatif et production du
savoir, ed. Luce Giard (Paris, 1995), 145-185. See: Commentaria, IV: 264 for Cabeo’s
discussion of the topography of the moon and Venus.
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meteorological text book.89 Jean-Baptiste Du Hamel’s De meteoris
et fossilibus (1660), in turn, was based on Aristotelian principles,
yet devoted many pages to chymistry.90 And, well after Cabeo’s
death, university lectures on the Meteorology continued to import
material from new philosophies, such as those of Descartes and
Newton, to students in Italy.91
Moreover, notoriously, the fourth book of the Meteorology has
been interpreted as promoting atomism and corpuscularism.
Throughout the twentieth century, classicists and philosophers
argued over whether the discussion of pores in this book re-
ferred to truly empty interstitial spaces, voids, and thereby sug-
gested the book’s inauthenticity.92 During Cabeo’s time, its
authenticity was not in question.93 Nevertheless, scholars were
aware that this book could be interpreted as atomistic. A century
before Cabeo, Pietro Pomponazzi, claiming that Aristotle “Demo-
crizat,” wrote in his commentary on Meteorology IV: “I would say
89 Étienne Gilson, “Météores cartésiens et météores scolastiques,” in Études sur
le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien 5th ed. (Paris, 1984),
102-137; Collegium Conimbricense, In quatuor libros de Coelo, Meteorologicos, &
Parva Naturalia, Aristotelis Stagiritae (Venice, 1606). The Coimbra work on the
Meteorology, despite its title, is not a commentary but rather a treatise composed
of four books each devoted to one of the elements. Gilson noted the structural
similarities between Descartes’ and the Coimbra meteorologies.
90 Jean-Baptiste Du Hamel, De meteoris et fossilibus (Paris, 1660). Lengthy dis-
cussions of chymistry are found at: 98-182, 283-310.
91 Brendan Dooley, “Science Teaching as a Career at Padua in the Early Eight-
eenth Century: The Case of Giovanni Poleni,” History of Universities 4 (1984), 127-
135. For attempts to reconcile Aristotle and the new natural philosophy of the
seventeenth century see: Christia Mercer, “The Seventeenth-Century Debate be-
tween the Moderns and the Aristotelians: Leibniz and Philosophia Reformata,”
Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa 27 (1990), 18-29; L. W. B. Brockliss, “Aristotle,
Descartes and the New Science: Natural Philosophy at the University of Paris,”
Annals of Science 38 (1991), 33-69.
92 The debate began with: I. Hammer-Jensen, “Das sogenannte IV. Buch der
Meteorologie des Aristotles,” Hermes 50 (1915), 118-136. A good summary of how
the debate has unfolded is found in Hans Strohm, “Beobachtungen zu vierten
Buch der aristotelischen Meteorologie,” in Zweifelhaftes im Corpus aristotelicum, ed.
P. Moraux and J. Wiesner (Berlin, 1983), 94-96; Carmela Baffioni, Il IV libro dei
Meteorologica di Aristotele (Naples, 1981) contains abstracts of most contributions
to this debate.
93 In the late fifteenth century, Bernardino di Treviso wrote that some judged
Meteorology IV as inauthentic but he disagreed with them. Who these people were
remains unknown, see his: Elucubrationes super libros Meteorologicos, Ms. Bologna BU
1664, fol. 265r: “Aliqui arbitrati sunt hunc quartum librum non esse philosophi.
Cuius oppositum censeo attamen non insisto circam ipsum quod non ita difficilia
tractantur prout in tertio ubi utitur stilo magis probabili quam in quartum.”
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94 Pietro Pomponazzi, Dubitationes in quartum librum Meteorologicorum (Venice,
1563), fol. 43v: “ergo Aristoteles Democrizat..., Ego dicerem, quod philosophus
assentitur Democrito in hoc, quoniam concedit poros.” See also: 47v: “Videtur
ibidem Aristoteles Democrizare, nam incidit in quaestionem Democriti. Qui voluit
quod actio fiat per poros.” See: Lüthy, “An Aristotelian Watchdog ,” 544-545.
95 For the relation of Meteorologyi 4 to alchemy from antiquity through the
Middle Ages see the essays: in Aristoteles Chemicus: Il IV libro dei Meteorologica nella
tradizione antica e medivale, ed. Cristina Viano (Sankt Augustin: 2002). For the
Meteorology as a source for Aristotelian discussion of experiments see: William R.
Newman, Promethean Ambitions, 238-289.
that the Philosopher agrees with Democritus, because he con-
cedes [the existence of] pores.”94
In addition to potentially promoting a corpuscular matter theory,
Meteorolgy IV also lent itself to reframing the traditional four
Aristotelian elements, as shown above. Cabeo’s revised form of
Aristotle stemmed from his exposure to new observations and
was confirmed by his particular reading of the Meteorology. The
decision to base his natural philosophy around the Meteorology
permitted Cabeo to develop an experiential and experimental
philosophy that integrated chymical matter theory with the ex-
plication of a traditional text.95 The large size of the Aristotelian
corpus, the numerous unresolved textual puzzles and apparent
doctrinal contradictions gave commentators the flexibility needed
to find the Aristotle that fit their needs. In the case of Cabeo, it
was an Aristotle modified by experience and intertwined with an
alchemical tradition that could compete with new natural phi-
losophies that were emerging in the first years of the seven-
teenth century. At that time, Aristotle could mean innovation as
well as tradition.
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